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Abstract
We analyze the link between pessimism and risk-aversion.. We consider a model
of partially revealing, competitive rational expectations equilibrium with diverse
information, in which the distribution of risk-aversion across individuals is unknown.
We show that when a high individual level of risk-aversion is taken as a signal for a
high average level of risk-aversion, more risk-averse agents are more optimistic. This
correlation between individual risk-aversion and optimism leads to a pessimistic
"consensus belief" hence to an increase in the market price of risk. Risk-sharing
schemes and welfare implications are analyzed. We show that agentswelfare may
increase upon the receipt of more precise information.
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1. Introduction
Several papers in recent nancial economics literature study models in which agents have
heterogenous beliefs. Beliefs heterogeneity might result from di¤erential information
(Green, 1973, Grossman, 1976, Genotte-Leland, 1980, Hellwig, 1980, Grossman-Stiglitz,
1981, Diamond-Verrecchia, 1981, Kyle, 1989), di¤erent opinions (Varian, 1985, 1989,
Abel, 1989, Harris-Raviv, 1993), di¤erent priors and Bayesian updating (Williams, 1977,
Detemple-Murthy, 1994, Zapatero, 1998, Gallmeyer, 2000, Basak, 2000, Gallmeyer-
Hollield, 2002), di¤erent processing of information (Dumas et al., 2005, Scheinkman-
Xiong, 2003), behavioral biases (Brunnermeier-Parker, 2005, Gollier-Muermann, 2006).
In equilibrium models with beliefs heterogeneity, it is shown that the belief of the
representative agent is given by the average of the individual beliefs weighted by the in-
dividual risk-tolerances (Abel, 1989, Detemple-Murthy, 1994, Calvet et al., 2002, Jouini-
Napp, 2004, 2006). This means that in order to determine the impact of beliefs hetero-
geneity on the equilibrium characteristics, it is particularly important to investigate the
nature of the link between individual risk-aversion and beliefs.
In this paper, our goal is to analyze the nature of this link in a rational expectations
equilibrium framework.
For this purpose, we consider a model of partially revealing, competitive rational
expectations equilibrium with diverse information. More precisely, we analyze a large
market with a continuum of traders who posess diverse pieces of private information
about the risky assets return as in e.g. Grossman (1976), Hellwig (1980), Genotte-
Leland (1980), Diamond-Verrecchia (1981), Admati (1985), Kyle (1989). Contrarily to
standard models, we suppose that agents do not know the distribution of risk-aversion in
the economy. Private information is aggregated and, due to the noise on the distribution
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of risk-aversion, is only partially revealed by the equilibrium prices. The equilibrium
prices together with the private information, create the beliefs held by agents in equi-
librium.
Assuming an imperfect knowledge of the risk-aversion is not an unrealistic assump-
tion since the individual (or collective) risk-aversion is in general hard to estimate and
the estimations strongly depend on the chosen methodology (lotteries as in Donkers
et al, 2001, option prices as in Jackwerth, 2000, etc.). As underlined by Jackwerth
(2000), "estimating risk-aversion functions directly is still notoriously di¢ cult". As a
consequence, there is no consensus in the literature on a precise aggregate risk-aversion
level. As underlined by Brennan and Torous (1999) "there is considerable controversy
among economists about what constitutes a reasonable level of risk aversion". Further-
more, many recent models consider state dependent preferences (rank-dependent utility,
relative consumption utility, habit formation, recursive utility) hence state dependent
risk-aversion levels; the knowledge of the individual level of risk-aversion would suppose
a continuous time monitoring of the individual choices and risk attitudes.
We prove existence results for such rational expectations equilibria and we obtain
closed form solutions for linear equilibria, thereby providing a theoretical rational expec-
tations framework for the study of the link between individual belief and risk-aversion.
The question under consideration is the following. Are more risk-averse agents more
optimistic? More optimistic refers to a higher posterior (after the observation of the
private signal and the equilibrium price) expected return of the risky asset. We start
from a model in which individual risk-aversions and individual beliefs are independent.
We suppose that a low (resp. high) individual level of risk-aversion is taken as a private
signal for a low (resp. high) average level of risk-aversion. We show that a positive
correlation between optimism and risk-aversion naturally emerges. The intuition is as
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follows. For a given equilibrium price, which, as we shall see, increases with the re-
turn of the risky asset and decreases with the average level of risk-aversion, a more
risk-averse agent perceives a higher average level of risk-aversion and, by observing a
given equilibrium price, infers a higher expected return. Furthermore we obtain that
the intensity of this correlation depends on the dispersion of the individual levels of
risk-aversion as well as on the degree at which the individual relies on his own level
of risk-aversion to estimate the average level of risk-aversion. In particular, when the
average risk-aversion is exogenously specied, i.e., when the agents do not consider their
own level of risk-aversion as informative for the average level of risk-aversion, there is
no correlation between optimism and risk-aversion.
When this correlation is positive, we analyze the consequences in terms of market
price of risk, risk-sharing and welfare. We nd that the market price of risk is higher than
in the standard framework, which is interesting in light of the risk premium puzzle. The
interpretation is the following. Since the belief of the representative agent is an average of
the individual beliefs weighted by the risk-tolerances, the positive correlation between
optimism (resp. pessimism) and risk-aversion (resp. risk-tolerance) induces a more
pessimistic consensus belief even though there is no bias on average on the individual
prior beliefs; pessimism at the aggregate level induces a higher risk premium and a
higher market price of risk. The reason why pessimism increases the market price of
risk is not that a pessimistic representative agent requires a higher market price of risk.
He/She requires the same market price of risk but his/her pessimism leads him/her
to underestimate the average rate of return of the risky asset. Thus the objective
expectation of the equilibrium market price of risk is greater than the representative
agents subjective expectation, hence is greater than the standard market price of risk
(see Abel, 2002, and Jouini-Napp, 2006).
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We also analyze the extent to which risk-sharing schemes are modied. In the clas-
sical situation, on average over the signals, a relatively very risk-averse (resp. tolerant)
individual will have very low (resp. high) optimal demand. In our setting, due to the
positive correlation between optimism and risk-aversion, the very risk-averse becomes
more optimistic, which heightens his optimal demand, and the very risk-tolerant agent
becomes more pessimistic, which lowers his optimal demand. In the end, there is less
dispersion in the optimal demands and less risk-sharing.
Our model also makes it possible to analyze how the arrival of more precise infor-
mation a¤ects the agentsutility at the individual or collective level. The correlation
between optimism and risk-aversion limits risk-sharing and has then a negative impact
on welfare. The arrival of more precise information therefore has a double impact: it
weakens the adverse e¤ect on trade (as risk-taking agents become less pessimistic, they
o¤er more insurance) and at the same time it strenghtens the Hirschleifer e¤ect (agents
are no longer able to insure against news that has already arrived). The rst e¤ect
fosters risk-sharing trade, while the second one discourages it. The paper discusses a
situation where the positive e¤ect on trade o¤sets the negative e¤ect. This means that
agents welfare may increase upon the receipt of more precise information. Although the
result seems intuitive, most of the previous literature has focused on the case with ho-
mogenous beliefs. In such a framework, only the Hirschleifer e¤ect is at work, therefore
better information typically reduces welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the equilibrium
concept. In Section 3, existence results as well as closed-form solutions in specic
settings are provided. Section 4 analyzes the correlation between risk-aversion and
optimism as well as other properties of the equilibria under consideration. All proofs
are in the Appendix.
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2. The model
We shall use the following version of Admati (1985)s model. There is a continuum of
agents, indexed by i 2 [0; 1] and 2 periods denoted by 0 and 1. Agents trade at date 0
and consume at date 1. Each agent i is endowed with an initial wealth w0i and one unit
of a given risky asset, and can allocate his initial endowment between a riskless asset and
the risky asset. For each unit purchased at date 0, the riskless asset yields one unit and
the risky asset eX units of a single consumption good at date 1. Using the riskless asset as
numeraire, let p be the price of the risky asset. If agent i holds i units of the risky asset,
his wealth at date 1 is given by fw1i = w0i+i eX  (i   1) p: Each agent i maximizes his
expected utility from consumption Ei [ui (fw1i)]. We suppose that the utility functions
exhibit constant absolute risk-aversion, more precisely ui (w) =   exp aiw where the
measurable function ea : [0; 1] ! R+ is such that ai represents agent is coe¢ cient of
risk-aversion. The distribution of risk-aversion among agents is unknown; each agent
only knows his own level of risk-aversion. In standard rational expectations models,
the unique meaningful risk-aversion parameter at the equilibrium is the representative
agent risk-aversion, which is given by the harmonic average of the individual levels of
risk-aversion. We denote by   R 10 1aidi the average risk-tolerance and by eZ   1 the
(harmonic) average risk-aversion. We suppose that both eX and eZ are unknown and
stochastic and that all agents have the same prior distribution for
 eX; eZ. Under the
assumption of CARA utility function, agent is demand for the risky asset is independent
of his initial wealth. It depends only upon the price p and the expectation operator
Ei; which is determined by agent is information Ii. The information Ii of agent i
consists of the equilibrium price and of his private information. As in standard models,
agent is private information rst consists of the observation of a signal eYi which is
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correlated with eX. More specically, eX  N  mx; 2x, the private signal eYi is given byeYi = eY + e"i; where e"i  N  0; 2" ; eY = eX  eU; ~U  N (0; 2u); e"i and eY are independent,
and e"i is independent of e"j ; j 6= i: The random variable eYi is a perturbation of the
random payo¤ eX by an error term eU common to all agents and by e"i, which a¤ects
only agent is signal. We assume, as in Admati (1985) a "law of large numbers", i.e.,
that1
R 1
0 e"idi = 0: Note that this model can account for diverse information as well
as diverse opinion. Indeed, it is equivalent to assume that each agent has a signal
and that the signals are randomly drawn around the true return or that each agent
has an opinion (this opinion is modeled by a belief conditional to the observation of
a private signal) and that these opinions are also randomly drawn around the true
return: In the di¤erential information framework individuals care about others beliefs
because they contain information (others private signals) and in particular, the average
of the individual signals contains more information than each individual signal. In the
heterogenous opinions framework, individuals care about others opinions if we assume
that everyone thinks that the average opinion is closer to the truth than any individual
opinion (conformity, informational social inuence).
Moreover, unlike previous literature, we suppose that the distribution of risk-aversion
in the economy is unknown and the average level of risk aversion is modeled by a ran-
dom variable. This randomness can be interpreted in two ways leading to two possible
specications. The rst interpretation is that there are econometric estimations of the
1 In general, if (Xi)i2[0;1] is a process of independent variables such that E [Xi] = 0 for all i and
V ar [Xi] is uniformly bounded, then for every sequence fing of distinct indices from [0; 1] ; the strong
law of large numbers applied to the sequence (Xin)n2N yields that
1
N
P
Xin ! 0 a.s. Thus it seems
natural to dene
R 1
0
Xidi  0: We will adopt the slightly more general convention: if the (Xi)i2[0;1] are
independent, with mean zero and bounded variance, and X 0i is almost surely integrable then
R 1
0
(Xi +
X 0i)di 
R 1
0
X 0idi: In our context, this means that
R 1
0
eYidi = eY
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average level of risk-aversion that are available and common knowledge. We suppose
then that agents agree on an exogenous distribution2 of eZ  N  mz; 2z where 2z mea-
sures the condence level of these estimations. In this case, agents private information
only consists of the private signal since agents do not infer any information from their
own observed level of risk-aversion. The second interpretation is that individual and
collective risk-aversion levels are di¢ cult to estimate in particular because these para-
meters may be state dependent and may evolve through time. In that case, agents rely
on their own level of risk-aversion in order to estimate the average level of risk-aversion.
In this setting, agents interpret their own level of risk-aversion as private information
on the average level of risk-aversion. We do not specify a particular form for the agents
prior on the risk-aversion distribution and the learning process. We simply assume that
the posterior distribution of the harmonic mean eZ following the observation of the in-
dividual level of risk-aversion ai satises eZ j ai  N  Ai; 2z where Ai = kai   ` with
`  0 and k 2 [0; 1] : The normality condition on the posterior distribution of eZ is
particularly satised if we assume for example that agents have a prior distribution of
risk-tolerance 1ea  N

1
z ;
2
z2

with3 z  N  m; 2 : However, in this case, the variance
of the posterior distribution depends on ai; and for reasons of tractability we impose in
2 In fact, eZ can only be positive, but it is standard in nancial economics, for easily understandable
reasons of tractability, to suppose a normal distribution, with a reasonably smallvariance.
3We obtain that the posterior distribution of Z; conditional to the observation of ai; is normal
with mean
ai
a2
i
2
+ m
2
1
a2
i
2
+ 1
2
and variance

1
a2i
2 +
1
2
 1
. In particular, for  = 1; which corresponds to the
situation where there is no prior on Z, the posterior distribution of Z; is normal with mean ai and
variance a2i
2:
More generally, if the agents have priors on the risk aversion distribution that are symmetric with
respect to a given parameter  (and then centered on ) and at priors on ; the observation of their
own level of risk aversion ai would lead to posteriors on the risk aversion distribution that are centered
on ai:
8
our model that the variance be the same for all agents. In fact, everything works as if
agents had another characteristic denoted by Ai that is directly linked to ai and that is
such that the harmonic average of the ai is equal to the arithmetic average of the Ai:
Now, the justication for letting the mean Ai be of the form kai   ` is the following.
For a large class of distributions, including the distributions that are symmetric with
respect to their average, without further information about the distribution of the level
of risk-aversion among individuals, the agents own level of risk-aversion ai is the best
possible estimate of the arithmetic average level of risk-aversion. However, the agents
goal is to estimate the harmonic mean of risk-aversion and it is well known that the
harmonic mean systematically lies below the arithmetic mean. The factor k measures
the degree at which individuals rely on their own level of risk aversion in order to esti-
mate the average level of risk aversion (idiosyncratic part) and  ` corresponds to the
isosyncratic part of the estimation.
We suppose that the objective distribution of risk-aversion in the economy as well
as the subjective posterior belief eZ j ai are independent of eX; eU and e"i and that all the
introduced random variables have a jointly normal distribution.
Since in the large economy, each agent is smalland the private signals are inde-
pendently distributed, the particular realizations of these private signals should have no
e¤ect on the realized equilibrium price. We will therefore search for equilibria in this
economy in which the equilibrium price only depends on market aggregates eY and eZ:
The following denition is standard.
Denition 1. An equilibrium for the economy is dened by a price ep and demand
Analogously, we obtain z  lnN

ln ai
2
+ m
2
1
2
+ 1
2
  1
2
2; 11
2
+ 1
2

(that we may approximate by a normal
distribution with the same rst two moments) when ea  lnN  ; 2 with   N  m; 2.
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functions
ei
i2[0;1]
such that (a) ep is eY ; eZ measurable; (b) ei 2 argmax Ei [ui (fw1i)];
(c)
R 1
0
eidi = 1:
In the next section, an equilibrium in the class of linear functions of eY and eZ is
sought.
Let us recall the properties of two standard models that we will use as benchmarks
for our analysis: the Walrasian equilibrium model (without rational expectations) and
the rational expectations model with perfect knowledge of the risk-aversion distribution.
In the Walrasian setting, the information Ii of agent i only consists of the observation
of the signal ~Yi so that the conditional distribution of ~X given Ii is given by N (mx +
(yi  mx) 
2
y
2"+
2
y
; 2u +
2"
2
y
2"+
2
y
): The optimal demand of agent i is given by
i =
1
ai
mx + (~Yi  mx) 
2
y
2"+
2
y
  ~p
2u +
2"
2
y
2"+
2
y
: (2.1)
We then derive from the market clearing condition that
~p = mx + (eY  mx) 2y
2" + 
2
y
  z
 
2u +
2"
2
y
2" + 
2
y
!
(2.2)
= (1  W )mx + W eY   zVW (2.3)
where W is equal to
2y
2"+
2
y
and VW is the ex-post variance V ar(Xj Ii):
In the rational expectations setting with perfect knowledge of the risk-aversion dis-
tribution, the agent learns from the observation of eYi and the equilibrium price. The
equilibrium price is given by4
4 It is well known that this model leads to a fully revealing equilibrium and then becomes problematic.
Nevertheless, we present it as a benchmark.
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ep = eY   z2u (2.4)
= (1  R)mx + R eY   zVR (2.5)
where R = 1 and VR is the ex-post variance V ar(Xj Ii):
Everything works as in a Walrasian setting where all agents would share their in-
formation and would then have a perfect knowledge of ~Y = ~X   ~U: Equation (2:5) is
then a particular case of Equation (2:3) and corresponds to 2" = 0: It is immediate
through these equations to see that the harmonic average z of the individual levels of
risk-aversion is the only meaningful risk-aversion parameter at the equilibrium. It sum-
marizes all the useful information about the risk-aversion distribution and corresponds
to the risk-aversion level of the representative agent. It also measures the sensitivity of
the equilibrium price with respect to the posterior level of risk V ar(Xj Ii).
3. Existence of equilibria
To begin, we consider the case of an exogenous specication of the average level of
risk-aversion and then the more interesting case of an endogenous specication.
3.1. Exogenous specication of the average risk-aversion
In this section, we suppose that agents agree on an exogenous distribution of eZ 
N  mz; 2z and do not infer any information from their own level of risk-aversion:More-
over, for the simplicity of the results in this setting, we assume that u = 0:
Theorem 1. If eZ  N  mz; 2z and u = 0; then there exists a unique equilibrium
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price within the class of functions of the form
ep = e + e eY   e eZ (3.1)
with e 6= 0:
This price has
8>>>>><>>>>>:
e = (1  e)mx +
 
e
2
"   (1  e)2x

mz
e =
2x+
2
x
2
"
2
z
2x+
2
x
2
"
2
z+
4
"
2
z
= 1+
2
"
2
z
1+2"
2
z+
4"
2x
2z
e = e
2
"
(3.2)
Another way to write the equilibrium price is
ep = (1  e)mx + e eY   e  eZ  mz  Vemz (3.3)
where Ve is the ex-post variance V ar(Xj Ii). Note that this variance does not involve
the signal value. It is known ex-ante and is common to all the individuals. The price
involves then a convex combination of eX and its average mx and e measures the
weight put on eX:We check that, as expected, e decreases with 2": Furthermore, when
2z !1; the price becomes uninformative and e converges to 
2
x
2x+
2
"
which corresponds,
as expected, to the weight W of eX in the Walrasian equilibrium. Finally, e decreases
when 2x increases and
2x
2"
is kept constant (constant relative precision of the signal)
which is also natural.
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3.2. Endogenous specication of the average risk-aversion
We now consider the setting with an endogenous specication of the average level of
risk-aversion. In this setting, agents interpret their own level of risk-aversion as private
information on the average level of risk-aversion. We simply assume that the posterior
distribution of the harmonic mean eZ following the observation of the individual level
of risk-aversion ai satises eZ j ai  N  Ai; 2z where Ai = kai   ` with `  0 and
k 2 [0; 1] :
3.2.1. Existence of an equilibrium
We start by proving the existence of an equilibrium in the general case with u > 0 and
then consider the case with u = 0:
Theorem 2. For u > 0; there exists an equilibrium price within the class of functions
of the form
ep = +  eY    eZ (3.4)
with  > 0 and  > 0:
The equilibrium price for the risky asset is an increasing function of eX; its payo¤,
and a decreasing function of eZ, the average level of risk-aversion. When the price
of the risky asset increases, an individual is uncertain whether it is the result of an
increase in the risky asset payo¤ or whether, on average, everyone is less risk-averse.
The observation of a given price should lead to an update of the distributions of eX andeZ in two opposite directions.
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Explicit computations lead to
ep = (1  )mx +  eY   1
(k   1)D + 1V
eZ   D
(k   1)D + 1V ` (3.5)
where V is the posterior variance and where  andD are given parameters between 0 and
1. In fact, this price corresponds to the equilibrium price in a Walrasian setting where
agent i has a belief on eX given by eX Ii  N (Ei( eX); V ) where Ei( eX) = E h eX Iii. It
can be written in the form,
ep = R Ei( eX)ai diR 1
ai
di
  V z (3.6)
and corresponds to the equilibrium price in an economy with homogenous beliefs in
which the common belief would be given by the average of the individual beliefs weighted
by the individual levels of risk-tolerance.
In order to obtain explicit solutions and to analyze qualitative properties of the
equilibria, we now consider the case u = 0: We suppose that there is enough noise in
the economy, more precisely we suppose that 2"
2
z  4k. This condition is analogous
to those in Glosten (1989) or Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1992). In this case, we obtain
two possible linear rational expectations equilibria and we shall see that one is more
natural than the other.
Theorem 3. If u = 0; and if 2"
2
z  4k; then there exist two possible equilibrium
prices within the class of functions of the form
ep = +  eX    eZ (3.7)
with  6= 0:
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These prices have
 = (1  )mx  
 
2"   (1  )2y
 (1  )2y`
(1  k) (1  )2y + k2"
(3.8)
 = 2"
(1  )2y
(1  k) (1  )2y + k2"
for two possible ;
  =
4y (1  k)2 +
 
k2   k2y2" + 122y2z4" + 4y2z2"   12q4y4z8"   4k4y2z6"
4y (1  k)2 + (k2   k)2y2" + k24" + 2y2z4" + 4y2z2"
(3.9)
+ =
4y (1  k)2 +
 
k2   k2y2" + 122y2z4" + 4y2z2" + 12q4y4z8"   4k4y2z6"
4y (1  k)2 + 2 (k2   k)2y2" + k24" + 2y2z4" + 4y2z2"
:
In fact, the cases u = 0 and u > 0 lead to the same third degree polynomial for
: When u is positive, this polynomial admits one or three roots in (0; 1) : When u
approaches 0, one of these roots converges to 1 which leads to  = 0: This solution is
then no longer admissible. We require an additional condition, namely 2"
2
z  4k; in
order to ensure that the polynomial admits other roots in (0; 1) :
When k = 0; which corresponds to the exogenous case,   is our solution e of
Section 3.1 and + = 1 corresponds to R of Section 2 and is a degenerate solution (full
revelation of ~X). More generally, we will see in the next section that only one of the
two roots, namely  , has good properties and is sensible.
Having solved the equilibrium price, it is now possible to explicitly examine agents
beliefs and demand functions in equilibrium. The following are straightforward corol-
laries of Theorem 4.
Corollary 4. Under the assumtions of Theorem 4, the distribution of eX as assessed
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by agent i using his private signal eYi; the equilibrium price ep and the observation of his
own risk-aversion ai, is normal with expectation
Ei
h eXi = Bi + C eYi +Dep (3.10)
and variance
V ari
h eXi  V = (1  )2y (3.11)
with
Bi = mx (1  ) +DAi  D (3.12)
C =
(1  )2y
2"
D =
2"   (1  )2y
2"
where  and  are the same as in Theorem 3.
Notice that Ei
h eXi increases with the private signal eYi, with the equilibrium price ep
and with the level of risk-aversion ai whereas V ari
h eXi is independent of ai; which means
that all other things being equal, the distribution of eX conditional to the information
Ii increases with the level of risk-aversion in the sense of the rst stochastic dominance.
3.2.2. Equilibrium selection and comparative statics
In this section, we consider the endogenous setting with u = 0; for which we have
found two possible equilibria (Theorem 3), and we argue, from di¤erent points of view,
that only one of the two roots, namely  ; has a natural behaviour. This means that
only one of the two possible equilibria is sensible. We start with asymptotic arguments,
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considering in particular the behaviour of both roots when the price becomes noninfor-
mative, i.e. when 2z !1. We then consider the behaviour of both roots with respect
to di¤erent variables, in particular 2x; 
2
" and 
2
z:
Let us analyze the behaviour of both roots   and + when the price becomes
noninformative, i.e. when 2z ! 1: It is easy to obtain that + !
2z!1
1 and that
  !
2z!1
2y
2"+
2
y
: When 2z ! 1; the natural value is 
2
y
2"+
2
y
: Indeed, an innite 2z
corresponds to the situation where the price becomes noninformative. The value
2y
2"+
2
y
is equal to W and corresponds to a Walrasian equilibrium in which each agent only
uses the private signal, and is therefore natural for an innite 2z, whereas the value of
1 is equal to R and corresponds to the situation in which information is fully revealed.
Furthermore, when 2z !1; it is easy to obtain from Corollary 4 that the conditional
expected value Ei
h eXi converges to 0 for + and to the expected value of an agent only
using the private signal given by mx(1  W ) + W eYi for  :
We now consider the behaviour of both roots, or more precisely their monotonicity,
with respect to di¤erent variables: We introduce the following notations. Let u  2"
2y
and v  2y2z: We are interested in the monotonicity of  with respect to 2" (precision
of individual information) when 2y and 
2
z remain constant. This amounts to computing
d
du when v remains constant:We prove in the Appendix that
d
du
  < 0: This means that
  decreases when the precision of individual information 1=2" decreases, when 2y and
2z remain constant. The converse result is obtained for 
+: The result obtained for  
seems natural; indeed, since the coe¢ cient   represents the weight in the equilibrium
price of eY ; which is the average of all private signals, it seems natural that it would
decrease when the precision of the individual signals decreases for all agents.
It is interesting to analyze the monotonicity of   with respect to 2y (total noise)
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when 
2
"
2y
and 2z remain constant. We compute
d 
dv and prove in the Appendix that
d
dv
  < 0; which implies that   decreases when the total noise 2y increases (when
2"
2y
and 2z remain constant). This means that the weight of eX in the equilibrium price,
represented by  ; decreases when the uncertainty about eX increases (other things
remaining equal), which seems natural. This is consistent with the result of Hellwig
(1980), in which the weight of eX in the equilibrium price also decreases with 2y when
2"
2y
remains constant. Moreover, if we want to analyze the behaviour of   with respect
to 2y when 
2
" and 
2
z remain constant, we compute  uDu + vDv: We prove in the
Appendix that this quantity is positive, which means that   increases when the total
noise 2y increases when 
2
" and 
2
z remain constant. In other words, the precision e¤ect
is stronger than the noise e¤ect. The same result, i.e. the weight of eX in the equilibrium
price increases with 2x; is obtained in Diamond and Verrecchia (1981).
Furthermore, the fact that ddv
  < 0 also means that   decreases when the total
noise 2z increases when 
2
" and 
2
y remain constant. In fact, when 
2
z increases, all other
things being equal, the price becomes less informative and the weight of eX in the price
is then smaller (and the relative weight of eZ is higher). The limit case is given by the
Walras case that corresponds to an innite value for 2z and to the smallest possible
value for  :
The converse results are obtained for +:
We now consider the behaviour of  :We prove in the Appendix that the coe¢ cient
r  = 
 
  ; which represents the relative contribution of
eZ and eX to variations in the
equilibrium price, increases when the total noise 2y increases when
2"
2y
and 2z remain
constant. Therefore the relative weight of the average level of risk-aversion eZ with
respect to the weight of the return of the risky asset eX increases with the uncertainty
on eX:
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Finally, we check for k = 1, that   increases with 2" (all other things being equal),
with 2z (all other things being equal), with 
2
x (when
2"
2x
remain constant) and with 2x
(all other things being equal).
4. Equilibrium Properties
In this section, we analyze the properties of the considered equilibria. We start by ana-
lyzing, in equilibrium, the natural link between pessimism/optimism and risk-aversion/risk-
tolerance. More precisely, we show that in the model with an endogenous specication
of the average level of risk-aversion, a positive correlation between optimism (resp. pes-
simism) and risk-aversion (resp. risk-tolerance) naturally emerges.
We then analyze the impact of this correlation on the market price of risk and on the
risk sharing schemes, and how they depart from those observed in the standard model.
Finally, our model also makes it possible to analyze how the arrival of more accurate
information a¤ects the agentsutility at the individual or collective level in an economy
with incomplete and di¤erential information. Once again, it is particularly interesting
to analyze how the results obtained in our setting di¤er from the standard ones in which
only the Hirschleifer e¤ect is at work.
4.1. Link between individual risk-aversion and belief
The aim of this subsection is to determine if, in our model, the interaction between
agents induces a correlation between individual belief and individual risk-aversion. More
precisely, having supposed that individual risk-aversion and individual prior belief (or
more precisely the individual signals) are independant, we analyze the impact of the
agents interaction through prices by computing the covariance between posterior belief
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(or more precisely the posterior expected return) and risk-aversion. We denote this
covariance by K: We will denote by K 0 the covariance between posterior belief and
risk-tolerance.
In the exogenous setting, it is immediate that there is no correlation between pos-
terior expected return and individual risk-aversion. Indeed, in this setting we have
E
h
~X
 Iii = Be + Ceyi +Deey  Deez (4.1)
and the covariance is then given by
Z 1
0
E
h
~X
 Iii ( 1
ai
  1
z
)di =
Z 1
0
[Be + Ceyi +Deey  Deez] (
1
ai
  1
z
)di (4.2)
=
Z 1
0
[Ceyi] (
1
ai
  1
z
)di
= 0:
It is easy to check that the same result holds in the two benchmark models considered
at the end of Section 2, namely the Walrasian equilibrium model and the fully-revealing
rational expectations model.
In the endogenous setting, we have seen that the agent individual posterior belief
increases with the level of risk-aversion in the sense of the rst stochastic dominance.
There is then a positive correlation between optimism and risk-aversion. In order to
measure the intensity of this correlation, recall that the individual posterior expected
return is given by
E
h
~X
 Iii = mx + C (yi  mx) +D ((y  mx)  (z  Ai)) : (4.3)
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If we denote by a =
R
aidi the average risk-aversion, the covariances K and K 0 are given
by
K =
Z 1
0
E
h
~X
 Iii (ai   a)di (4.4)
= D
Z 1
0
(Ai   z)(ai   a)di
= D
Z 1
0
(kai   `  z)(ai   a)di
= DkV ar(ai) > 0;
and
K 0 =
Z 1
0
E
h
~X
 Iii ( 1
ai
  1
z
)di (4.5)
= D
Z 1
0
(Ai   z)( 1
ai
  1
z
)di
= Dk
Z 1
0
(ai   z)( 1
ai
  1
z
)di
= Dk(1  a
z
) < 0:
Both covariance formulas involve the dispersion of individual risk-aversion levels. In-
deed, the ratio az (where a is the arithmetic average of the individual risk-aversion levels
and z the harmonic average) is directly related to the dispersion.
Optimism (resp. pessimism) and risk-aversion (resp. risk-tolerance) are positively
correlated. The intuition for this positive correlation is simple. In the model with an
endogenous specication of the average level of risk-aversion, for a given equilibrium
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price, which, as we have seen, increases with the return of the risky asset and decreases
with the average level of risk-aversion, a more risk-averse agent will perceive a higher
average level of risk-aversion and, by observing a given equilibrium price, will infer a
higher expected return.
Our formulas for the equilibrium price are similar to those of Diamond and Verecchia
(1981) except that our random variable ~Z is replaced by the total supply. In their setting
the total supply is a random variable and each agent takes into account his own supply
in his estimation of the total supply. In our setting, the individual posterior distribution
of the average level of risk-aversion for agent i increases in the sense of the rst-order
dominance with the risk-aversion of agent i: In their setting, the individual posterior
total supply distribution for agent i increases in the sense of the rst-order dominance
with the supply of agent i: This therefore leads to a positive correlation between indi-
vidual optimism and individual supply in the setting of Diamond and Verecchia (1981).
However, in their case, there is a nite number of agents and the impact of individual
supply on the total supply tends to be negligible when the number of agents increases.
4.2. Collective pessimism
The positive correlation we have found between risk-tolerance and pessimism is partic-
ularly important since as shown by Jouini-Napp (2004) in a di¤erent setting, such a
positive correlation induces pessimism at the aggregate level (even if, on average, there
is no pessimism at the individual level); pessimism at the aggregate level increases
the risk premium and decreases the risk free rate (Abel, 2002, Jouini-Napp, 2005),
which is interesting in light of the risk premium and risk free rate puzzles.
The aim of this section is to analyze the impact of the correlation between risk-
tolerance and pessimism on the consensus belief (i.e. the belief which, if held by all
22
individuals, would lead to the same equilibrium price).
We have already seen in Equation (3.6) that
ep = R Ei( eX)ai diR 1
ai
di
  V z (4.6)
and the equilibrium price in our setting corresponds then to the equilibrium price in an
economy with homogenous beliefs in which the common belief is characterized by its
rst two moments
R Ei( eX)
ai
diR
1
ai
di
and V: The collective pessimism/optimism is then measured
by
R Ei( eX)
ai
diR
1
ai
di
= zK 0 +
Z 1
0
E
h
~X
 Iii di (4.7)
If we consider the average collective pessimism/optimism (over all possible states of
the world) we obtain
Z 0@R Ei( eX)ai diR
1
ai
di
1A dP(Y;;Z) = mx  Dz(1  k) D` < mx: (4.8)
The collective belief is then pessimistic even though there is no bias in the individual
beliefs after the observation of the private signals. Indeed,
R 1
0 E
h
~X
 yii di is equal to
mx on average (over all possible states of the world).
4.3. Market price of risk
The aim of this section is to analyze the impact of the collective pessimism (or of the
correlation between belief and risk-aversion) on the market price of risk.
In the setting of the two benchmark models, we easily deduce from Equations (2.3)
and (2.5) that the ex-ante average price (over all the possible states of the world) is of
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the form
p = mx   zV (4.9)
where V is the ex-post variance V (Xj Ii).
Equation (4:9) implies that in both settings, the ex-ante "risk-premium" (measured
by the spread between the average assets payo¤ and the average assets price) is given
by zV and the average "price of risk" is given by z: It then appears that the introduction
of rational expectations does not modify the average price of risk.
Now let us consider the case with an exogenous specication of the average level
of risk-aversion. From Equation (3.3), we obtain that the ex-ante average price in this
framework is
p = mx   e (z  mz)  Vemz: (4.10)
If the exogenous distribution on ~Z is unbiased, i.e. if mz = z; the average ex-ante risk-
premium is given by V z and the average price of risk is given by z: The introduction
of an exogenous noise on the average level of risk-aversion then has no impact on the
average price of the risk with respect to the two considered benchmark frameworks.
Note that the condition that mz = z is equivalent to assuming that there is no bias on
average on the posterior beliefs, i.e.
R
E
h
~X
 Iii dP(Y;"i;Z) = mx:
The conclusions in the case with an endogenous specication of the average level of
risk-aversion are quite di¤erent. From equation (3.6), we have
p = mx  Dz(1  k) D`  zV (4.11)
= mx   1
(k   1)D + 1V z  
D
(k   1)D + 1V `
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In the case k = 1, this formula resembles the one obtained in the Walrasian case
except for our additional term  DV ` which corresponds to K 0: The ex-ante average
price of risk is then given by z+D`: The introduction of an endogenous specication of
the average level of risk-aversion then leads to an increase in the market price of the risk
with respect to the benchmark cases and with respect to the exogenous specication
case.
In the case k < 1; the average market price of risk is given by 1(k 1)D+1 (z +D`) :
Since D  1; we have 1(k 1)D+1  1 and we obtain a more pronounced impact on the
market price of risk.
In the case k = 1 and when the precision of the signals is su¢ ciently high, i.e. when
2" is small, the parameter D is near 1. This means that the market price of risk is
around z+ ` and the increase in the market price of risk with respect to the benchmark
cases is measured by z+`z the ratio between the arithmetic average of the individual
levels of risk aversion and the harmonic average of the individual levels of risk aversion.
For instance, when the individual levels of risk aversion follow a log-normal distribution
ai  lnN (; 2); the arithmetic average is equal to exp
 
+ 12
2

, the harmonic average
is equal to exp
 
  122

and the ratio is equal to exp2.
The interpretation of the increase of the market price of risk in the setting with
an endogenous specication of the risk-aversion is the following. Since the belief of
the representative agent is an average of the individual beliefs weighted by the risk-
tolerances, the positive correlation between pessimism and risk-tolerance induces a more
pessimistic consensus belief, hence higher risk premium and market price of risk.
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4.4. Risk-sharing schemes
The aim of this subsection is to determine the extent to which an endogenous speci-
cation of the average level of risk-aversion modies the risk sharing schemes.
We compute the average of the individual optimal demand over the di¤erent possible
signals, that we shall denote by M endi :
M endi 
Z
id"i (4.12)
=
Dk
(k   1)D + 1 +
(1 D)
(k   1)D + 1
z
ai
:
We rst note that, since D  1; Mi is decreasing in ai; which is natural; a more
risk-averse agent will have a lower optimal demand in the risky asset.
We now compare the risk-sharing schemes in the endogenous setting with the refer-
ence situationof an exogenous specication of the average level of risk-aversion. With
M exoi denoting the average (over all possible signals) of individual optimal demands in
the "reference situation", we easily obtain
M exoi 
Z
id"i (4.13)
=
z
ai
:
The benchmark models lead to the same result.
There is less risk-sharing in the endogenous setting. More precisely, the impact of the
dispersion of the level of risk-aversion among individuals is weakened in the endogenous
setting, in the sense that the less risk-averse insure less than in the reference setting.
The interpretation is simple. In the reference situation, on average over the signals, a
relatively very risk-averse (resp. tolerant) individual will have very low (resp. high)
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optimal demand. In the endogenous setting, as we have seen in the previous subsection,
the very risk-averse becomes more optimistic, which raises his optimal demand, and the
very risk-tolerant agent becomes more pessimistic, which reduces his optimal demand.
As a result, there is less dispersion in the optimal demands.
4.5. Welfare considerations
The aim of this section is to analyze how the arrival of more precise information a¤ects
the agentsutility at the individual or collective level in an economy with incomplete and
di¤erential information in which the distribution of risk-aversion is a source of noise.
Once again, it is particularly interesting to analyze how the results obtained in our
setting di¤er from the standard ones, in which only the Hirschleifer e¤ect5 is at work
and the arrival of more precise information typically reduces agentswelfare.
We shall dene an aggregate utility function, representing the average welfare of the
economy, and analyze how it reacts to an increase in the precision of the information.
In this section and for reasons of tractability, we assume that the utility function of
agent i is of the following mean-variance form
ui (w) = aiEi [w]  1
2
a2iV ari [w] : (4.14)
5The possibility that information may have a negative value is commonly known in literature as
the Hirshleifer e¤ect. Drèze (1960) was the rst to identify this phenomenon and Hirshleifer (1971)
formalized Drèzes argument using a general equilibrium setting. In his example, there are two states
of the world, agents are risk averse and the endowments of wealth in the two states di¤er across the
agents. If the agents trade in complete markets for contingent claims before the state is realized, then
they will share some of the risk. If, however, the agents perfectly learn the state before they trade, then
there will be no trade at all; thus, from an ex ante viewpoint, under perfect information each agent
simply consumes his endowment, which is Pareto inferior to the allocation of risk with no information.
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It leads to the same optimization program as with the exponential utility function, i.e.,
the optimal demand for the risky asset is given by
i =
E [X j Ii]  p
aiV
: (4.15)
The level of utility attained by agent i at the optimal demand i is then given by
Ui = aiEi [i (X   p) + p]  1
2
a2iV ari [i (X   p) + p] (4.16)
=
1
2
(a+ byi + cy + dAi + ez)
2 + ai (+ y   z)
with 8>>>><>>>>:
a = 1p
V
mx (1  )  
b =  c = Cp
V
d = e1 D =
1p
V
D
(k 1)D+1
(4.17)
In the endogenous setting, for each agent, the individual level of utility, at the optimal
demand, can be written in the following form Ui = g (Y; "i; Z) ; where (Y; "i; Z) 
N  mx; 2x
N  0; 2"
N  Ai; 2z : Ex-ante, the average level of expected utility for
agent i is then
Z
g (y; ei; z) dP(Y;"i;Z) (y; ei; z) (4.18)
= ai (+ mx   Ai) + 1
2
e22z +
1
2
e2A2i + (a+ (b+ c)mx + dAi) eAi +
1
2
c22"
+
1
2
(a+ dAi)
2 + (a+ dAi) (b+ c)mx +
1
2
(b+ c)2 2x +
1
2
(b+ c)2m2x
 h (Ai)
Now, in order to compute an average level of utility among the agents, we need a
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distribution on the Ai, and the average level will then be given by
R
h (q) dPAi (q) : We
now consider the case k = 1 and we make the assumption that Ai  N
 
z; 2z

which
means that there is no collective bias in the individual estimations of the collective
risk-aversion: We have
Z
h (q) dPAi (q) =
1
2
(1 D)2 V 2z +
1
2
V
2"
+ (z + `) (mx  DV `)  V z` (4.19)
+D`V (1 D) z   1
2
V (z2 + 2z) +
1
2
D2`2V +D2V `z:
Before choosing specic values for mx; y; z; z and `; let us rst remark that the
derivative of the quantity under consideration with respect to 2" is independent of mx
and we can set mx = 0: Furthermore, in the case k = 1 and for a small dispersion of
the individual levels of risk aversion, we may check that we have
Z
1
ai
di
 1
 a
1 + V ar(ai)
a2
 : (4.20)
Since we have z = a  l then our parameters should satisfy z 

z + `  2z(z+`)

:
Figure 1 shows that with well chosen parameters, the aggregate utility level decreases
then increases when the information precision increases.
In the endogenous setting, the correlation between pessimism and risk-aversion that
we have exhibited limits risk sharing and has a negative impact on welfare. The arrival
of more precise information therefore has a double impact: it weakens the adverse e¤ect
on trade (as risk-taking agents become more optimistic, they o¤er more insurance) and
at the same time it brings about the Hirschleifer e¤ect (agents are no longer able to
insure against news that has already arrived). The rst e¤ect fosters risksharing trades
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and the second one discourages them. The rst e¤ect is predominant for large precision
levels and the second one is predominant for small precision levels. Figure 2 shows that
the positive e¤ect on trade may o¤set the negative e¤ect for all precision levels.
The same type of result has been obtained in Hatchondo (2006) in a rather di¤erent
setting. In his model, noise takes the form of an unknown level of endowment. The
structure of the model does not allow for an analytical solution and the paper only relies
on numerical techniques. Note that a similar result was obtained in models with infor-
mation asymmetries, like in Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991), Rahi (1996), Marin and
Rahi (2000), etc. In these models, information asymmetry generates an adverse selec-
tion e¤ect since the less informed reduce their participation due to their informational
disadvantage. In this framework, the arrival of more precise information reduces the
information asymetry, hence weakening the adverse selection e¤ect. Although di¤erent,
the mechanism by which the Hirshleifer e¤ect is counterbalanced shares similarities with
the one presented in our model.
This means that in an economy with di¤erential information, agents welfare may
increase upon the receipt of more precise information. Although the result seems intu-
itive, most of the previous literature has focused on the case with homogeneous beliefs.
In such a framework, only the Hirschleifer e¤ect is at work, and so better information
typically reduces welfare.
5. Conclusion
We have shown that the non observability of others level of risk-aversion leads to a
positive correlation between optimism and risk-aversion. Indeed, the equilibrium price
increases with the return of the risky asset and decreases with the average level of
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risk-aversion. Hence, more risk-averse agents perceive an equilibrium price that seems
too high and infer from there high expectations on the assets return. This positive
correlation induces pessimism at the aggregate level; even though there is no pessimism
on average in the individual beliefs/signals, the consensus belief is pessimistic since the
beliefs of the more risk-tolerant agents are more heavily weighted. Pessimism at the
aggregate level induces then a higher market price of risk.
Furthermore, the positive correlation between optimism and risk-aversion leads the
less risk-averse to insure less than in the standard setting and induces less risk sharing
among agents. This e¤ect decreases when agents receive more precise information about
the traded assets. The arrival of more precise information has then two e¤ects: an
increase of the total welfare due to an increase of the risk-sharing and a decrease of the
total welfare related to the well-known Hirschleifers e¤ect. We show that the global
e¤ect might be in both directions.
It is interesting to note that a positive correlation between optimism and risk-
aversion has been empirically observed in a purely behavioral setting by Ben Mansour
et al. (2006). In this last paper, the authors show that agents exhibit pessimism and
that more risk-averse agents are more optimistic.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
Suppose that the equilibrium price is of the form ep = e + e eX   e eZ: Then the
triple
 eX; eYi; ep is normally distributed with a mean vector
(mx;mx; e + mx   mz)
and a variance-covariance matrix0BBBB@
2y 
2
y e
2
y
2y 
2
y + 
2
" e
2
y
e
2
y e
2
y 
2
e
2
y + 
2
e
2
z
1CCCCA :
We easily obtain that the conditional distribution of eX given Ii is also normal with
mean of the form
Ei
h eXi  E h ~X ~Yi = yi; ep = e + ey   ezi
= mx +

2y e
2
y
0B@ 2y + 2" e2y
e
2
y 
2
e
2
y + 
2
e
2
z
1CA
 10B@ yi  mx
e(y  mx)  e(z  mz)
1CA
= mx + Ce (yi  mx) +De (e(y  mx)  e(z  mz))
= Be + Ceyi +Dey  Deez
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with 8>>>><>>>>:
Ce =
2e
2
z
2
y
2e
2
y
2
z+
2
e
2
y
2
"+
2
e
2
z
2
"
De =
e
2
y
2
"
2e
2
y
2
z+
2
e
2
y
2
"+
2
e
2
z
2
"
Be = mx (1  Ce  Dee) + eDemz
and
V ari
h eXi  V ar h ~X ~Yi = yi; ep = e + ey   ezi
= 2y  

2y e
2
y
0B@ 2y + 2" e2y
e
2
y 
2
e
2
y + 
2
e
2
z
1CA
 10B@ 2y
e
2
y
1CA
= 2y (1  Ce   eDe)
 Ve
which is independent of the realizations of eYi and ep:
As in the standard setting, since the utility functions are exponential and the con-
ditional distribution of eX given Ii is normal, it is well known that the portfolio opti-
mization problem leads to a demand function given by ei = Ei[ eX] ep
aiV ari[ eX] ; hence
ei = Be + Ceyi +Deey  Deez   e   e eX + e eZ
aiVe
The market clearing conditions can be written as
Z 1
0
eidi = 1
Ve
h
(Be   e) eZ 1 + Ce eX eZ 1i+ 1
Ve
"
Ce
Z 1
0
e"i
ai
di+ (De   1)
 
e eX eZ 1   e Z 1
0
eZ
ai
di
!#
= 1
33
or equivalently, since
R 1
0
e"i
ai
di = 0;
(Be   e) eZ 1 + (Ce +Dee   e) eX eZ 1   (De   1) e = Ve:
There exists an equilibrium of the form (3:1) if and only if
8>>>><>>>>:
e = Be = mx (1  e) + eDemz
e =
Ve
(1 De) =
2x(1 e)
(1 De)
Ce +Dee = e
:
It is easy to verify that, under the condition Ce +Dee = e; we have
8>>>><>>>>:
2e =
2e(1 e)2y2"
 2y2z+e(2y2z+2z2")
Ce = (1  e) 2" 2y
De =
 
e
2
y   2y + e2"

 2" 
 1
e
and
e =
2x (1  e)
(1 De) ,
2e (1  e)2y2"
 2y2z + e
 
2y
2
z + 
2
z
2
"
 = 2e4"
, e =
2x + 
2
x
2
"
2
z
2x + 
2
x
2
"
2
z + 
4
"
2
z
:
Hence the unique solution of the previous system is
8>>>><>>>>:
e = mx (1  e) +mz
 
2"e   2x (1  e)

e =
2x+
2
x
2
"
2
z
2x+
2
x
2
"
2
z+
4
"
2
z
e = e
2
"
:
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Proof of Theorem 2
Note rst that the conditional distribution of eX given eYi ,  +  eY    eZ and ai
is the same as the conditional distribution of eX given eYi and ep   +  eY    eZ witheZ  N  Ai; 2z : Since the triple  eX; eYi; ep is normally distributed with a mean vector
(mx;mx; + mx   Ai)
and a variance-covariance matrix0BBBB@
2y + 
2
u 
2
y 
2
y
2y 
2
y + 
2
" 
2
y
2y 
2
y 
22y + 
22z
1CCCCA ;
we easily obtain that the conditional distribution of eX given Ii is also normal with mean
of the form
E
h
~X
 ~Yi = yi; ep = + y   zi
= mx +

2y 
2
y
0B@ 2y + 2" 2y
2y 
22y + 
22z
1CA
 10B@ yi  mx
(y  mx)  (z  Ai)
1CA
= mx + C (yi  mx) +D ((y  mx)  (z  Ai))
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and
V ar
h
~X
 ~Yi = yi; ep = + y   zi
= 2y + 
2
u  

2y 
2
y
0B@ 2y + 2" 2y
2y 
22y + 
22z
1CA
 10B@ 2y
2y
1CA
= 2y (1  C   D) + 2u
 V
which is independent of the realizations of eYi and ep; with
(C;D) =

2y 
2
y
0B@ 2y + 2" 2y
2y 
22y + 
22z
1CA
 1
=
 
22z
2
y
22y
2
z + 
22y
2
" + 
22z
2
"
;
2y
2
"
22y
2
z + 
22y
2
" + 
22z
2
"
!
:
As in the standard setting, since the utility functions are exponential and the con-
ditional distribution of eX given Ii is normal, it is well known that the portfolio opti-
mization problem leads to a demand function given by ei = Ei[ eX] ep
aiV ari[ eX] : This gives
i =
E
h
~X
 ~Yi = yi; ep = + y   zi  ep
aiV ar
h
~X
 ~Yi = yi; ep = + y   zi
=
mx + C (yi  mx) +D ((y  mx)  (z  Ai))  (+ y   z)
aiV
Since Ai = kai   ` and
R 1
0
e"i
ai
di = 0; we have
Z 1
0
idi =
1
V

(mx(1  C  D)   D`)Z 1 + ((k   1)D + 1) + (C +D   )Y Z 1

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and there exists an equilibrium of the form (3:4) if and only if
8>>>><>>>>:
 = mx (1  ) D`
 = 1(k 1)D+1V
C +D = 
or 8>>>><>>>>:
 = mx (1  ) D`
 = 1(k 1)D+1
2
y (1  C   D) + 2u
C +D = 
:
Since C and D are functions of  and , it is easy to see that the third line of the
system can be written in the form f (; ) = 0: Analogously, the second line of the
system can be written g (; ) = 0; and there exists an equilibrium of the form (3:4) if
and only if there exists a couple (; ) satisfying f (; ) = 0 and g (; ) = 0: Now, for
y" > 0;
f (; ) = 0, 2 = 
2 (1  )2y2"
2y
2
z (   1) + 2z2"
:
Then
C =
(1  )2y
2"
D =
(   1)2y + 2"
2"
and
g (; ) = 0,  = 
2
"
 
2u + 
2
y   2y

2y (1  k    + k) + k2"
:
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There is a couple (; ) satisfying f (; ) = 0 and g (; ) = 0 if and only if
24"
 
2u + 
2
y   2y
2 
2y (1  k    + k) + k2"
2   2 (1  )2y2"2y2z (   1) + 2z2" = 0
or equivalently if and only if
22"(A3
3 +A2
2 +A1 +A0)
2z
 
2y   k2y   2y + k2y + k2"
2  
(   1)2y + 2"
 = 0
with
A3 = 
6
y   2k6y + k26y   2k4y2" + k22y4" + 2k24y2" + 4y2z4" + 6y2z2";
A2 = 6k
6
y   36y   3k26y + 4k4y2"   k22y4"   4k24y2"
 24y2z4"   36y2z2"   22u2y2z4"   22u4y2z2";
A1 = 3
6
y   6k6y + 3k26y   2k4y2" + 2k24y2" + 4u2z4" + 4y2z4"
+36y
2
z
2
" + 2
2
u
2
y
2
z
4
" + 4
2
u
4
y
2
z
2
" + 
4
u
2
y
2
z
2
";
A0 = 2k
6
y   6y   k26y   6y2z2"   22u4y2z2"   4u2y2z2"
or equivalently if the following polynomial cancels
P () = A3
3 +A2
2 +A1 +A0:
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Now, since
P (0) = 2k6y   6y   k26y   6y2z2"   22u4y2z2"   4u2y2z2"
=  2y
 
4y   2k4y + k24y + 4u2z2" + 4y2z2" + 22u2y2z2"

< 0
and
P (1) = 4u
2
z
4
" > 0;
there exists at least one root for this polynomial between 0 and 1:
Proof of Theorem 3
As seen in the proof of Theorem 2, there exists an equilibrium of the desired form
when u = 0 if and only if P () = 2y (   1)Q() = 0
with
Q() = B2
2 +B1 +B0
for
B2 = (1  k)24y + k24"   2k2y2" + 2k22y2" + 2y2z4" + 4y2z2";
B1 = 
2
y
  2(1  k)22y + 2k2"   2k22"   2z4"   22y2z2" ;
B0 = 
4
y((1  k)2 + 2z2"):
Then P () = 0 either for  = 1 or for  solution of Q () = 0: The solution  = 1 gives
D = 1; C = 0 and  = 0 and is therefore excluded: We now look for the possible roots
of Q:
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For 2"
2
z  4k; we nd the following two roots,
  =
4y (1  k)2 +
 
k2   k2y2" + 122y2z4" + 4y2z2"   12q4y4z8"   4k4y2z6"
4y (1  k)2 + (k2   k)2y2" + k24" + 2y2z4" + 4y2z2"
+ =
4y (1  k)2 +
 
k2   k2y2" + 122y2z4" + 4y2z2" + 12q4y4z8"   4k4y2z6"
4y (1  k)2 + 2 (k2   k)2y2" + k24" + 2y2z4" + 4y2z2"
:
Since Q (0) = B0 = 4y((1  k)2 + 2z2") > 0 and Q (1) = B0 + B1 + B2 = 4"k2 are
positive, either both roots belong to (0; 1) or they are both outside (0; 1). Let us prove
that they are in (0; 1): It is easy to verify that B1 is negative and that B2 is positive.
Indeed, B1 =  2y
 
2(1  k)22y + 2k22" + 2z4" + 22y2z2"
   2y2z4" + 2k2"2y which
is negative since 2z
2
"   4k > 0: The quantity B2 satises
B2 = 
4
y   2k4y + k24y + k24"   2k2y2" + 2k22y2" + 2y2z4" + 4y2z2"
= (k   1)24y + k24"   2k2y2" + 2k22y2" + 2y2z4" + 4y2z2"
> (k   1)24y + k24"   2k2y2" + 2k22y2" + 4k2y2" + 4k4y
> (k   1)24y + k24" + 2k22y2" + 2k2y2" + 4k4y
hence is positive.
This implies that  B1 >
p
B21   4B0B2 and  ; which is given by
 B1 
p
B21 4B0B2
2B2
;
is positive: Since the product of both roots B0B2 is positive, 
+ is also positive. Now,
  < 1 if and only if + < 1; or equivalently if and only if the average of the roots
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  B12B2 < 1 or equivalently (since B2 > 0) if and only if  B1   2B2 < 0: Now,
B1 + 2B2 = 2k
24"   2k2y2" + 2k22y2" + 2y2z4"
> 2k24" + 2k
2
y
2
" + 2k
22y
2
"
> 0
and   and + both belong to (0; 1) :
Proof of Corollary 4
Immediate using the proof of Theorems (2) and (3) :
Proof of ddu
  < 0:
We have  =
(1 k)2 ku+k2u+ 1
2
u2v+uv  1
2
u
p
u2v2 4kuv
(1 k)2+k2u2 2ku+2k2u+u2v+uv , hence
Du =  

E1 + E2
p
u2v2   4kuv

2
p
u2v2   4kuv (uv   2ku  2k + k2 + 2k2u+ u2v + k2u2 + 1)2
with
E1 = vu
 
2uv   6k   6kuv + 12k2   6k3 + 4k2u  4k3u+ 2k2uv + 2k3u2 + u2v2 + 2k2u2v
E2 =  2k + 2uv   4kuv + 6k2   6k3 + 2k4 + 4k2u  8k3u+ 4k4u+ 2k2uv
 2k3u2 + 2k4u2 + u2v2 + 2k2u2v:
The sign of Du is then the opposite of the sign of E1+E2
p
u2v2   4kuv: It remains
to prove that this quantity is positive. We show that (E1)
2  

E2
p
u2v2   4kuv
2
> 0
and that E1 > 0:
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We have
E21   E22
 
u2v2   4kuv
= ( 4) vuk3  8k   2uv + kuv   4k2   4  uv   2ku  2k + k2 + 2k2u+ u2v + k2u2 + 12
whose sign is the same as P (k) = 8k 2uv+kuv 4k2 4: The roots of this polynomial,
if they exist, are given by 18uv +
1
8
p
u2v2   16uv + 1 and 18uv   18
p
u2v2   16uv + 1:
Since uv >
p
u2v2   16uv, both roots, if they exist, are greater than 1 and the sign
of P (k) ; for k between 0 and 1, is the sign of P (0) and is then negative. The sign of
E21   E22
 
u2v2   4kuv is then positive.
The sign of E1 is given by the sign of
G (u; v; k) =
 
2uv   6k   6kuv + 12k2   6k3 + 4k2u  4k3u+ 2k2uv + 2k3u2 + u2v2 + 2k2u2v :
We have G (u; v; 0) > 0: It remains to show that G does not cancel on the domain
uv > 4k in order to obtain that E1 is positive. Let X = uv: We have
G (u; v; k) = X2 +X
 
2k2   6k + 2k2u+ 2+ 12k2   6k   6k3 + 4k2u  4k3u+ 2k3u2;
whose roots are 3k k2 k2upk4   k2   2k2u  2k3u+ 2k4u  2k3u2 + k4u2 + 1 1:
One of the roots can be greater than 4k if and only if
3k   k2   k2u+
p
k4   k2   2k2u  2k3u+ 2k4u  2k3u2 + k4u2 + 1  1 > 4k
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or if and only if
p
k4   k2   2k2u  2k3u+ 2k4u  2k3u2 + k4u2 + 1 > k + 1 + k2 + k2u
or equivalently if and only if ( 2) k (k + ku+ 1)2 > 0 which is not true.
Proof of ddv
  < 0:
The quantity ddv
  can be written in the form
d
dv
  =

 1
2

(U   V )
(uv   2ku  2k + k2 + 2k2u+ u2v + k2u2 + 1)2
with
U = uv   2k + 4k2   2k3 + 4k2u  4k3u+ k2uv   2k3u2 + 2k2u2v + k2u3v;
V =
p
u2v2   4kuv(1  k2   2k2u  k2u2);
and U2   V 2 = 4k2  uv   2ku  2k + k2 + 2k2u+ u2v + k2u2 + 12 > 0:
It remains to verify the sign of U: This quantity can be written in the form
U = X
 
k2 + 2k2u+ k2u2 + 1

+ 4k2   2k   2k3 + 4k2u  4k3u  2k3u2
There is a root such that X > 4k if and only if  4k2 2k 2k3+4k2u 4k3u 2k3u2
k2+2k2u+k2u2+1
> 4k
or equivalently if and only if
 4k2 + 2k + 2k3   4k2u+ 4k3u+ 2k3u2   4k  k2 + 2k2u+ k2u2 + 1 > 0.
This quantity is equal to ( 2) k (k + ku+ 1)2 and is then negative. Hence ddv  <
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0:
Proof of  uDu + vDv > 0
Modulo some positive terms, the quantity  uDu + vDv is given by
 uDu + vDv = E3   E4
with
E3 = uv   2k   4kuv + 6k2   6k3 + 2k4 + 4k2u  8k3u+ 4k4u+ 3k2uv   2k3u2
+2k4u2 + u2v2 + 4k2u2v + k2u3v;
E4 =  
p
u2v2   4kuv(1  2k + uv + k2   k2u2):
We check that
E23   E24 = 4k2
 
uv   2k + k2 + 1  uv   2ku  2k + k2 + 2k2u+ u2v + k2u2 + 12
and the sign of  uDu + vDv is then given by the sign of E3:
Let X  uv, E3 is then a polynomial in X whose roots are 2k  32k2 2k2u  12k2u2
1
2
p
k4   2k2   8k2u+ 8k4u+ 2k2u2 + 14k4u2 + 8k4u3 + k4u4 + 1  12 :
Let us check that both roots are such that X   4k < 0:
We have
X   4k = E5  E6
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with
E5 =  2k   3
2
k2   2k2u  1
2
k2u2   1
2
;
E6 =
1
2
p
k4   2k2   8k2u+ 8k4u+ 2k2u2 + 14k4u2 + 8k4u3 + k4u4 + 1:
We have E5 < 0 and E25   E26 = 2k (k + 1) (k + ku+ 1)2 > 0: Hence X   4k < 0:
The sign of  uDu + vDv is then constant for k in [0; 1] and, for k = 0; we have
 uDu + vDv = uv + u2v2 > 0:
Proof that r    
  increases when the total noise 
2
y increases with
2"
2y
and 2z constants.
We have  =
(1 )2y 1
(k 1)(2y 2y+2") 2"  1+1
hence
D




=    2y   k2y   2y + k2y + k2" 2 4"2yk < 0
Moreover, the derivative of  with respect to X = 
2
y is given by
DX

(1  )X 1
(k   1) (X  X + 2") 2"  1 + 1

=
 
X  Xk  X +Xk + k2"
 2
(1  ) k4" > 0
and the derivative with respect to X = 2" is given by
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DX
 
(1  )2y 1
(k   1)  2y   2y + XX 1 1 + 1
!
=
 
Xk + 2y   k2y   2y + k2y
 2
(1  k) (   1)2 4y > 0:
This implies that when 2y and 
2
" increase with the precision
2"
2y
kept constant, then,
as seen above,   decreases, 2y and 2" increase, hence

 increases.
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